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ABSTRACT 
This paper builds a formal theory of consumer behavior 
under imperfect information when goods are described by multiple 
characteristics which vary in their degree of "ob servability." An 
optimal strategy for the consumer is shown to exist. In general, this 
strategy is shown to involve both inspection (sampling to observe 
general characteristics of goods) and evaluation (consumption of 
goods to observe specific characteristics) . Comparative statics 
of the optimal strategy are.also analyzed 
1. INTRODUCTION
The general importance of drawing a distinction b etween 
information concerning characteristics of goods which are directly 
observable and information concerning characteristics which cannot 
b e  observed without actual "consumption" in sdme appropriate 
sense has just begun to b e  realized by economists. Labor economists 
have implicitly b een making use of just such a distinction for some 
time. For example, researchers on labor mobility in the early 50's 
such as Reynolds (1951) emphasized that high job turnover by young 
workers could be explained in part as a kind of job-shopping. More 
recently, Pencavel (1972) has used the notion that all characteristics 
of jobs cannot be ob served by simply sampling firms as the basis 
for an equilibrium model of job quits, and Wilde (1976) has explored 
the nature of optimal search strategies when jobs are characterized 
by multiple characteristics, some of which are directly observable 
and others which cannot be observed without actually taking the job. 
Besides these applications to the quit-rate problem (which 
emphasize the supply side of the labor market) , the distinction b etween 
different kinds of information can be used to analyze other problems, 
both in the labor market and in other markets characterized b y  
imperfect and costly information. Stiglitz (1975] applies it to the 
economic theory of screening and education, and Nelson (1970) uses 
it in a unique approach to consumer behavior in product markets. 
Nelson partitions goods into two classes, search goods and 
experience goods. The distinction between the two classes is drawn 
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in terms of the consumer's preferred mode of evaluating the potential 
stream of utility yielded by purchasing the good. For search goods 
the evaluation occurs prior to purchase; that is, a decision to 
purchase the good is based only on price (and other directly observable 
characteristics) , not on any unobservable qualitative .features of the 
product. By contrast, experience goods are those for which the 
primary information process used to evaluate the potential utility 
of a purchase is actual consumption of the good. 
This paper builds a theory of consumer behavior under 
imperfect information when goods are described by multiple 
characteristics, some of which are directly observable and others 
which cannot be observed without actually consuming the good. 
The fundamental assumption in the paper is not that goods, 
per se, can be partitioned into classes according to their informational 
properties, but rather that characteristics of goods can b e  so 
partitioned. That is, two classes of characteristics are defined, 
general and specific, General characteristics are those which can 
be observed without actually consuming the good, and specific 
characteristics are those which cannot be observed without consumption. 
Information concerning general characteristics will be called general 
information and information concerning specific characteristics will 
be called specific information. And finally, investment in general 
information will be called search or inspection, as suggested by 
Hirshleifer (1973] , and investment in specific information will b e  
called evaluation.1 
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While these definitions of general and specific information 
seem analogous to Nelson's definitions of search and experience goo�s, 
there is a fundamental difference; Nelson focuses on goods as total 
packages of characteristics while.the concepts of specific and general 
information focus directly on the individual characteristics. To see 
the difference, suppose a good is described by a vector of characteristics 
(x1, x2, • • • , xn) • Nelson assumes each value xi is potentially
observable prior to purchase and that the consumer must choose b etween 
paying a "search cost" and ob serving all xi prior to purchase or paying
Clearly the purchase price and ob serving all xi by direct consumption. 
this all or nothing property is strong. For example, consider the 
case of experience goods. Since each good is evaluated by direct 
consumption, the good must actually be purchased, so at least the 
purchase price is ob served. But this cannot, by definition, effect 
the decision as to which good to buy. For experience goods, Nelson 
assumes "consumers either sample at random from among all brands or 
from those brands in the price range the consumer deems appropriate 
for himself." This implies that the consumer either ignores price 
altogether or has perfect information about price and is imperfectly 
informed only about qualitative characteristics. 
There are several ways to avoid these logical difficulities. 
In keeping with the spirit of Nelson's definitions, one could assume 
each characteristic x
i 
is potentially observable by paying a 
characteristic-specific search cost, ci. Now the consumer draws goods 
at random and ob serves at least price. Subsequently he can either 
buy the good, ob serve more characteristics prior to purchase, or 
reject the good and draw a new ob servation. This is essentially 
the kind of prob lem analyzed by MacQueen [19f2] , and while it 
preserves the flavor of Nelson's approach, it also makes the 
significant shift in emphasis from goods to characteristics. In 
a sense, Nelson's search goods and experience goods are speical 
cases in this model; search goods are those for which all 
characteristics (x1, x2, • · 
, x ) are necessarily ob served prior n 
to purchase (at cost equal to the sum of all c., i = 1, • . . , n) , l. 
and experience goods are those for which only price is ob served 
prior to purchase (and, furthermore, all prices are acceptable) . 
The point of departure of this paper is to consider goods 
for which a subset of the characteristic-specific search costs are 
infinite; that is, this paper considers consumer demand for products 
which possess some characteristics that cannot b e  observed prior to 
consumption. The following example illustrates the consumer's 
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prob lem. Consider a good which can b e  described by two characteristics, 
price and quality. Price is directly observable b ut quality can only 
be observed via consumption of the good. Assume there is some 
variance across goods with respect to b oth characteristics, and 
the consumer knows the distribution of both (note the distrib utions 
may not b e  independent) . Then a consumer will search until he finds 
an acceptable price, after which he makes a purchase and evaluates 
the quality of the good he has bought. Now it is quite possible 
that he be disappointed with his evaluation of the good and, upon 
his next purchase of the good, return to the market with the intent 
of searching once more for an acceptable price, repeating the 
Until he finds an acceptable price-quality evaluation process 
combination, 
· f 11 s The next section The layout of the paper is as o ow • 
defines the specific search environment for this problem, Section 
three then sets up the dynamic programming problem faced by the 
h 1 t funct<onal equation, �nd establishesconsumer, derives t e re evan • 
conditions under which there is a unique reservation price, Section 
four developes some speci ic L 'f' propert<es of the optimal policy for 
the genera case. • 1 In Part<cular, it is shown that one of the 
following situations applies for any given level of search costs: 
(1) all prices and all qualities are acceptable; (2) all prices 
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are acceptable b ut some quality levels will b e  rejected, acceptab le 
quality is a function of observed price; (3) some prices. are rejected 
as well as some quality levels, acceptable quality remains a function 
of price; or (4) only the lowest price is acceptab le, some quality 
levels are rejected. Corollary to this categorization are the 
no Search goods in the sense Nelson uses ob servations that there are 
then quality must matter for some prices) that term (if price matters 
and experience goods exist only when search costs (with respect to 
price ob servation) are zero. Section 5 considers a special model which 
i h respect to Changes in the lifetime of the good allows comparisons w t 
being purchased, It is argued there that an increase in durability 
lowers both the reservation price and reservation qualities causing a 
shift away from evaluation and towards inspection, A final section 
discusses and summarizes the results obtained, 
market, 
2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
The problem analyzed in this paper is set in the product 
Goods vary with respect to both price and some non-price
characteristic, quality, Consumers are imperfectly informed 
about the specific price/quality pairs offered by specific firms, 
'For a given cost they can, however, draw samples from the market 
distribution and ob serve. price prior to consumption. Formal 
.assumptions defining the search environment follow. 
Al) Each good is described b y  a pair «p, q) where p is 
price.and q is quality, Price is.directly observable 
and quality can only be observed via actual consumption 
of the good. 
A2) U(p, q) is the total net value to the consumer of 
purchasing a good with price p and quality q. Each 
good has a lifetime of s periods, Assume U (p, q) is 
continuous, differentiable, and bounded on its domain 
with au(p, q) /()p < 0 and au(p, q) /aq > o. 2 
A3) Let �(p, q) b e  the joint p,d, f.defining the market 
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distribution of p and q, where pE:[pa , pb] and qE:[qa, qb]. 
Assume the consumer knows �(p, q) with certainty. 
A4) The cost of drawing an observation at random from 
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¢(p,q) and observing price is cs. The cost of returning 
to a specific firm and repurchasing a given good is 
U(p,q). 
c and c are measured in the same units as s r 
AS) The consumer can sample as many observations from 
¢(p,q) as he likes at the beginning of each period 
but demands at most one unit of the good per period.3 
A6) The consumer desires to maximize the discounted 
stream of utility of consumption, net of search 
costs. Sampling is without recall, the horizon is 
infinite, and the discount rate is 0 < � < 1.
In the environment defined by these six assumptions, the 
consumer faces the following problem. He knows ¢(p,q), By paying 
cs he can draw an observation from this distribution, say (p0,q0),
but he observes only p0• Information regarding q0 is provided by 
the conditional distribution of q given p0, say g(qlp0). In the 
�bsence of any constraintson the distribution ¢(p,q), there is no 
definite relationship between price and expected long-run utility 
from purchasing the good. For example, if there is a strong positiVA 
correlation between price and quality, then the consumer might reject 
low prices and search out higher ones. On the other hand, if this 
positive correlation is weak enough (or, in general, non-existent) 
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then low prices will be preferred to high prices. Another possibility 
is disjoint intervals of acceptable prices separated by ranges of 
unacceptable prices. Clearly, it will be necessary to put more 
structure on ¢(p,q) to get strong results. For the sake of discussion, 
assume that p and q are positively correlated, but 
that low prices are preferred to high systematically. In this case, 
if p0 (the observed price) is low enough, then t�e consumer may 
decide to purchase the good. Otherwise he rejects it and draws 
another observation from ¢(p,q). If he buys the good he receives 
4 U(p,q) over the s period lifetime of the good, At the end of 
s periods the consumer can either pay cr and repurchase (p ,q ), 0 0 
or he can sample again from ¢(p,q) at cost cs. In general, there 
will be a positive probability of the consumer not being satisfied 
with q0 since there will be ranges of price for which the conditional 
expected utility of consumption is high enough to warrant purchase, 
allowing for the possibility of being disappointed. Given a little 
more structure on ¢(p,q), it is possible to show that the optimal 
policy is a sequential-lexiographic process whereby the initial 
purchase decision is based on some critical value of p, and the 
decision whether to stay with a particular (p,q) combination is based 
on a critical value of q, That is, the optimal strategy is characterized 
by a pair (p*,q*(p)) such that at each stage of the decision process if 
(1) 
{
p
> 
p � 
p*: 
p*: 
sample again 
buy the good and if 
{
q
< 
q � 
q*(p): 
q*(p): 
sample again after s periods 
repurchase the good. 
3
·
. THE OPTIMAL POLICY: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS 
OF A RESERVATION PRICE 
The searcher's objective is to maximize the discounted 
stream of utility net of search costs from consuming the good. 
Let V(p) be the expected value of this flow when a current 
observation of p has just been drawn. Define Ve as the expected 
value of V(p) taken with respect to the marginal distribution of 
p; that is, 
(2) 
Pb 
Ve= f V(p) f(p)dp, pa 
where f(p) is defined by 
(3) 
If the consumer follows an optimal strategy in searching, V(p) is 
defined by 
(4) V(p) -c +max {V , B(p, V )} , s e e 
where B(p, Ve) is the expected discounted flow of utility conditional 
on buying the good priced at p, when the expected net utility of 
search is Ve' assuming an optimal policy is pursued subsequent to 
the purchase. The logic of (4) is that the consumer must pay cs 
to observe p. If p is an acceptable price then V (p) = -cs+ B (p, Ve). 
If p is not acceptable then a new draw is taken from �(p,q) and the 
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expected utility of searching, V , is received: i.e. V(p) = -c + V • e s e 
Thus, the critical value of p is defined by Ve = B(p*, Ve). The 
immediate problem is to uncover conditions which guarantee such a 
p* exists and is unique. 
Consider B(p,Ve). If the consumer purchases the good
after observing p, then he receives U(p,q) over the s-period 
lifetime of the good. But at the time he makes the decision to 
purchase, he hasn't observed q. The expected utility of consumption 
(net of price) during the first.s periods is 
q(p) 
(5) E[U(p,q) !Pl = f U(p,q)g(q , p)dq, 
q(p) 
where g(q i p) is the conditional p. d.f. of q given p, defined on 
[q(p), q(p)]. At the end of s periods the consumer can either 
repurchase the good or draw a new sample from �(p,q). The decision 
is clearly based on the observed value of q. If the consumer 
repurchases the good he receives [U(p,q) - er] every s periods (if 
he repurchases once after observing q, he will never switch). If 
he samples again he receives Ve. Therefore, define q*(p,Ve) by 
or 
(6a) 
V = [U(p,q*(p,V ))-c ]  + Bs[U(p,q*(p,V ))-c ]+ • •  , e e r e r 
00 
V = l Bis[U(p,q*(p,V )) - c ]. e i=O e r 
q*(p,Ve) is the quality level which makes the consumer indifferent 
between repurchasing the good (p,q*(p,Ve)) and sampling again. 
Note that <lU(p, q) /<lq > 0 implies q* (p, Ve) is unique. But q is 
bounded for any p ,  qe: [q(p) ,  q(p)]. Thus , q*(p ,Ve) as defined by 
(6a) can be driven above q(p) when V is high and below q(p) whene 
Ve is low. In the former case define q*(p , Ve) = q(p) and in the
latter q*(p, Ve) = q(p). Then when q*(p , V ) = q(p) it must be thate 
(6b) 
00 • 
V � l f3l.S(U(p ,q(p)) - Cr)e i=l 
and when q*(p,Ve) = q(p) it must be that
(6c) v e
00 
< l f3is[U(p, q(p)) - cr].5i=l 
Let G(qjp) the c. d.f. associated with g(qjp). Then, since 
ClU(p ,q)/Clq > 0, q < q*(p ,V  ) implies the consumer resamples, ande 
q � q*(p , Ve) implies the consumer repurchases. So the probability
that the consumer samples again after s periods is G(q*(p , V  )jp).e 
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The probability he repurchases the original good is [1-G(q*(p , V  )jp)],e 
Define W(p, Ve) as the discounted expected utility of consumption
conditional on repurchasing the good when price p is originally 
observed (i.e. conditional on q 2 q* (p, Ve)). Then B (p , Ve) is
defined by 
(7) B(p ,V  ) = E[U(p,q)lpJ + f3
s{G(q*(p , V  )jp) V e e e
+ [1-G(q*(p , V  )jp]W(p ,V  )}e e 
where W(p , Ve) is given as
(8) 
'q(p) if 00 is [1-G(q*(p ,ve) jp)J- \I/ [U(p , q)- cr]}g(qjp)dq,
q*(p;V ) e 
and q(p) is the upper limit on the conditional distribution g(qjp). 
Using (5) ,  (7) , and (8) in equation (4) the basic functional 
equation associated with the consumer's problem can be written as 
(9)  
s • V(p) = -c +max {V , E[U(p , q) jp] + f3 [G(q*(p,V ) jp)V s e e e 
+ [1-G(q*(p ,V  )jp))W(p , V  )]}e e 
The immediate problem is to show that (9) has a unique solution. 
Establishing such a result is straightforward and is not sensitive 
to the precise form of 9(p , q), The following theorem is proved in 
the appendix. 
Theorem 1: Given ( Al)+ (A6)" there exists a unique, continuous, 
bounded solution to the functional equation (9) ,
In the present setting , theorem 1 is not as  strong as  it 
might seem, It only establishes that (i) for any observed p there 
is a determinate solution to accepting or rejecting the good and 
that (ii) Ve is unique and can thus be treated as a constant.
Theorem 1 does not imply p* is unique. Figure 1 illustrates the 
case where there are three values of p such that B (p , Ve) = Ve.
12 
Prices in the ranges [pa, pfJ and [p� ,p�] are acceptable but
observations at prices in the ranges [pf, p�] and [p� , pb] are rejected.
There are two natural sets of sufficient conditions for 
p* to be unique in this setting. One is B(pa' Ve)> Ve and
ClB(p , V  )/Clp<O for all p in [p , pb]. The other conditions aree a 
B(p , V )  < V and ClB(p , V  )/Clp>O for all p in [pa ,pb]. In thea e e .e 
v e 
p* 
1 
p* p* Pb 2 3 
12a 
Figure 1: Optimal Policy Rule for Multiple .Ranges of Acceptable Prices
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former case low prices are acceptable and high prices are not, while 
in the latter case the opposite is true. Both of these cases are 
consistent with the notion that higher quality is associated with 
higher price. Here this translates as ClG(qjp)/Clp < O; i.e. the 
probability that quality is less than some given q falls as price 
rises _..:_ higher price implies that "on average" quality is higher. 
But it is the combination of price and quality which is important; 
the distribution of U(p,q) is what matters to the consumer. 
Let q(w,p) be the value of q which sets U(p,q) = w. Then 
Clq/Clp = -U/U2 > O. Define ·'!'(wjp) as the c.d. f. of w= U(p,q)
conditional on p. Then 'l'(wjp)'=G(q(w,p)jp), and 
(10) Cl'l'(wlp) Clp 
aGCCllP> + C''I ) � Clp g q p ()p • 
With ClG/qjp)/Clp « 0 it is not possible to sign CllJi·(wjp)/Clp since 
both g(qjp) and Clq/Clp) are positive. In general one would expect 
Cl'l' (wjp)/Clp> O. That is, a higher price should denote less utility 
for any good within a generic class. This is the case, for example, 
when price and quality are independent. In the absence of an 
equilibrium model which generates 'l'(p,q) endogenously, or of a more 
precise specification of what "quality" means, independence may be 
a reasonable working assumption, especially since the crucial 
property is not ()G(qjp)/Clp < 0 but rather ()'l'(wjp)/Clp > 0. In the 
remainder of this section it is simply assumed Cl'l'(wjp)/Clp > 0. 
00 
Proof: From (6), noting l $is = 1/1-$s, B(p, Ve) can be writteni=O 
q(p) 
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�J.-1:) (/I) B(p, Ve) = E[U(p,q) jp) + $s{V G(q*(p, V ) jp) + _h__ I (U(p,q) - cr)g(qjp)dq}e e l�$s 
From (5), 
(12) 
s E[U(p,q)jp) + H(p, V )e 
q(p) 
E[U(p,q)lpJ = I U(p,q)g(qlp)dq 
q(p) 
But using o/(wjp) = G(q(w,p)jp) and defining w(p) = U(p, q(p)), and 
w(p) = U(p,q(p)), (12) becomes
(13) 
�(p) 
E[U(p,q)I p] = f w• (w!p)dw . 
w(p) 
Integrating by parts, 
(14) E[U(p, q)jp] = w(p) 
w(p) - f (w!p)dw,
w(p) 
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and differentiating with respect to p, 
(15) 
w(p) 
<lE[U(p,q)fil = -f <lo/(wjp) dw < O, dp <lp 
w(p) 
Now consider the second half of (11). Using the definition of q*(p, Ve)
and substituting o/(wjp) for G(qjp) gives 
(16) 
w<p> 
H(p, V,) = a'{v,• (v, c1Ca'> + c,1•) + C�a") I (w-or)o/(wlp)dw }
v (1-$s) + c e r
Integrating (16) by parts 
$s{v o/ (v (1-$s)+c IP) + ( -1- ) e e r l-$s 
�(p) 
(w-cr)o/(wjp) I 
v (1-$s) + c 
w(p) 
e r 
- . Ca•J f •<wlp)dw } 
.�ollecting terms gives H(p, Ve) as
v (1-$s) + c e r 
w(p) 
(17) H(p, V 0) - ti�:, ){{;;(p) - •r) -f • (wf p)dw } 
v (1-Bs) + c e r
Differentiating (17) with respect to p and combining the result with 
(15), 
dB(p,Ve) dE[U(p ,q)i p] dH(p,Ve)(18) + 
dp dp dp { ii(p) 
J "j;I» dw + 11-Bs
w 
Thus, d'l'(wip)/dp > 0 implies aB(p,V )/dp < O. e 
Lemma 3: 
�(p) Ja.(w[El 
dp 
dw }
v (1-Bs) + c e r
Proof: The proof of this lemma is by contradiction. Suppose 
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Thus max { V  ,B(p,V )} = V  e e e
and V (p) = - cs + Ve for all p E: [pa, pb] • But then integrating over 
p gives Ve = -cs + Ve which implies cs = 0.
Thus B(p ,V ) > V • a e e 
This contradicts c > O. s 
Theorem 4: If a'!'(wlp)/ap > .Q then either B(p,Ve) > Ve for all
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p E: [pa,pb] or there exists a unique p* E: [pa,pb] such that B(p*,Ve) = Ve.
p* = pa if and only if cs = 0. 
Proof: Clearly with B(pa,Ve) > Ve and aB(p,Ve)/dp < 0 then either
B(p,Ve) cuts Ve in [pa,pb] or B(p,Ve) > Ve for all p E: [pa,pb]. If
B (p, Ve)·· intersects Ve then p* is uniquely defined by B (p*, Ve) = Ve.
If, however, B(p,Ve) > Ve for all pE: (pa,pb) then define p* = pb. In
this case search costs are so high as to make all prices acceptable, 
at least prior to observing q. 
To show p* = pa if and only if cs = O, consider the following
argument. For p < p*, V(p) = -cs + B(p,Ve) and for p..:::. p*,
V(p) = -cs +Ve. Thus
(19) 
p* 
v, - -c, +� f B(p,V0) f(p)dp + [1 - F(p*)J V,}
lp a 
Rearranging (19), 
(2) c s
p* f [B(p,V ) - V ] f(p)dp • .
. e e 
But Ve = B(p*,Ve). Thus,
(21) 
P* 
c, = J [B(p,V0) - B(p',V0)) f(p)dp. 
Pa 
f(p) is the marginal distribution of p and is strictly positive on 
[pa , p*] •  [B(p , Ve)-B(p*, Ve)] > O for p£ [pa , p*]. Thus, p* = pa if
�nd only if cs = O.
p* is the reservation price. The optimal strategy for the consumer 
in this problem is analogous to simple search models; the consumer 
draws observations from $(p , q) (effectively draws of p from f (p)) 
until he finds one less than p*. In the simple problem he would 
buy the homogeneous good at price p in all subsequent periods. 
Here , because goods are heterogeneous with respect to quality , he 
buys the good just once, until he can evaluate q. If q is less 
than q*(p) then he draws again from $(p ,q),  but p* does not change. 
Figure 2 illustrates the case where.oB(p,Ve)/op < 0 and p* £ (pa,pb)
is unique. 
Figure 2: 
p* 
Unique p* when oB(P, V ) /o·p < O.e 
18 
4. PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL POLICY
The optimal policy of the consumer is summarized in two 
variables and two equations. 
(22a) 
(22b) 
v e 
p* 
'• • J [B(p , Ve) - B(p• , v.>J f(p)dp .
Pa 
With some manipulation of these two equations , comparative statics 
are reasonably straightforward. In particular , dp*/dcs > O; as
search costs rise so does the reservation price. This is not 
surprising. More interesting results concern the relationship of 
acceptable prices to acceptable quality levels. 
Comment 5: p* = pb does not imply q*(p) = q(p) for all p£ [pa
,pb] ,
where q(p) is the lower limit on the conditional p. d. f. g(q i p). 
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Consider the following counterexample. Assume B(pb , Ve) = Ve.
The claim is that q*(pb) > q(pb). Assume the opposite. Then by
definition 
(23) v <e-
U(pb , q(pJ ) - cr
1 - i3s
, By assumption, though, Ve is given as
(24) 
(25) v e 
q(pb)' this can be written as
E[U(pb,q)jpb] - S
scr
1 - SS 
From (23) we have, then, that q*(pb) = q(pb) implies
(26) 
Clearly there is a contradiction here since q(pb) is the minimum
quality associated with price pb. Even if cr is zero, (26) cannot
be satisfied unless the conditional p. d. f. g(qjpb) is degenerate.
Comment 5 says that even if all prices are acceptable, 
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} . 
some quality levels may not be acceptable. In effect, it demonstrates 
that when search costs are high the good � be an "experience" 
&ood; the consumer ignores price and samples until a satisfactory 
quality level is found (notice the "search cost" here is not 
associated with observing quality prior to purchase). The quality 
level which is acceptable is not independent of price, though. 
That is, if p* = pb then q*(p) may exceed qa and in any case is
still sensitive to the observed price -- there is no "reservation" 
quality independent of price. 
Theorem 6: p* E (pa,pb) implies q>�(p*) > q(p*) where q(p*) is the
lower limit on the conditional p. d.f. g(qjp*). 
Proof: 
(27) 
But V e
(28) 
Assume q*(p*) = q(p*). Then, by definition, 
V < U(p*,q(p*))- cr e -
B(p*,Ve). When q*(p*) = q(p*), B(p*,Ve) is
E[U(p*,q)jp* ]- S
sc r
1 - (3s
Thus, (27) and (28) imply 
(29) U(p*,q(p*)) .'.':. E[U(p*,c:J.) IP*l + (1- (3
s) c r
As long as g(qjp*) is non-degenerate, this leads to a contradiction, 
even when c = 0. Thus, g* (p*) > q (p*).r 
Theorem 6 says that quality is never irrelevant when price matters. 
That is, if it pays to set a reservation price strictly less than 
Pb' then at that reservation price (and in a neighborhood of it)
it pays to reject some quality levels. The theorem does not imply 
q*(p) > q(p) for all ? 2 p*. For example, at pa it may be optimal
to accept all quality levels rather than resample. In one sense 
theorem 6 is very strong: it implies there are no "search" goods 
regardless of the level of search costs. In fact, if cs= 0, then
p* =Pa• but q*(pa) is not necessarily equal to q(pa). The
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following corollary demonstrates that if c + 0 as c + O (certainlyr s 
the case when c > c for all c and c ) ,  then q*(p ) < q(p ).s- r s r a a 
q*(p*) < q(p). 
Proof: a�(wjp)/ap > 0 implies that p is the optimal pricea 
and g(qjp ) is the optimal distribution from which to draw quality samples.a 
Thus cs= 0 implies p* =pa. The proof of theorem 6 then applies,
yielding q*(p*) = q*(p ) > q(p ). To see that q*(p ) <q(p ). a a a a 
assume the opposite. Then by definition 
(30) 
But V e
(31) 
U(p ,q(p )) - c a a r
1 - SS 
V =E[U(p , q)jp ) + !3sV e a a e
u(p ,q(p )) a a 
1 - SS 
when q*(pa) = q(pa). (30) and (31) together imply
(32) 
which is clearly a contradiction when g(qjpa) is nondegenerate.
Thus , q*(pa) < q(pa).
If er remained positive as cs + O, then it might pay to always
resample since repurchase involves the cost c . But this is a sillyr 
assumption when cs= 0 • Corollary 7 describes the case analyzed by
Nelson [1970]; the only relevant "search costs" are the opportunity 
6 costs of consuming at a low quality level. Whan c� = 0 =er, then,
goods are truely experience goods in the sense that Nelson uses 
that term. But to get to this case it is not only necessary that 
the cost of direct sampling of quality be high (in this model it is 
infinite), but it is also necessary that the cost of observing price 
be zero. 
To summarize, then , consider first cs= 0 =er. In this
case p* =pa (the lowest price) and only quality matters. The
consumer sets a reservation quality q* = q*(pa) = q*(p*) and
samples from g(qjp ) until he finds a quality level which beats q*.a 
.Now let cs 2:_ er > O. Assume pa < p* < pb. In this case it may or
may not be true that q*(p) > q(p) for any given acceptable price 
(p < p*); for some prices all quality levels may be acceptable 
23 
(recall q(p) is the lower bound on g(qjp)). But at p* , q*(p*) > q(p*); 
at the margin it always pays to allow for the possibility of 
rejecting some quality levels. As cs rises , so does p*. Eventually
p* = pb, the maximum price, and all prices are acceptable. Now in
this case goods are experience goods in the sense that any price 
is acceptable, but acceptable quality levels are still sensitive 
to the observed price; that is , q*(p) is sensitive to the observed 
price, p. 
Let cs continue to rise. Here B(pb , Ve) > Ve and, by
definition, p* = pb' In this case (22) can be written
(33) c s
The question is , c.an c rise high enough that q*(p) = q(p) for alls 
p. Suppose this is the case. Then
(34) 
1 - BS 
Thus, P* Pb and q>�(p) = q(p) for all p implies
(35) 
·p
> 
v 
=fEtu(p , q) ,p]f(p)dp _ e 1 - Bs
Pa 
or , after rearranging and letting E*[U(p , q)] be the expected value 
of U(p , q) over $(p ,q) ,  
(36) 
So, as c5 rises , eventually all prices become acceptable. But
quality levels still matter. Only when cs is large enough for (36)
to be satisfied can quality become irrelevant also. 
Following Nelson, it would be desirable to get comparative 
statics with respect to s. But as it stands there is no way to 
let s change without changing the net utility per period obtained 
from a given purchase, One way around this is to let U(p , q) be 
linear in p and adjust prices to keep per period utility constant 
when s changes. This is taken up in the next section, 
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5. DURABILITY: CHANGES IN s
In order to make comparisons between different durabilities, 
it is necessary to control for the flow of utility obtained by paying 
particular prices. Let the net utility of purchase be linear in price 
and assume 
(37) U(p , q) 
s 
. 1 l Bi- [u(q) - p] b(s)[u(q) - p],
i=l 
s 
where b(s) = l Bi-l. At any given price-quality pair, the difference
i=l 
in a purchase at duration s and duration s + 1 is Bs [u(q) - p]. This
is desirable since in the absence of repurchase costs (er) the total
discounted "cost" of maintaining a given per-period flow of utility 
u(q
0
) when the pair (p
0
, q
0
) has been drawn from $(p,q) is independent
of the durability of the good. Assuming U(p ,q) is defined as in 
(37)' an increase in s has two effects when Cr > O; since repurchase
is postponed into the future, the cost of observing a low value of q 
is increased, but at the same time the repurchase cost, er' is paid
less often. 
A second major change in the basic model is to assume that 
price and quality are distributed independently. The necessary 
condition oo/(wip)/op > 0 is maintained but independence makes some 
computation easier. 
(38) 
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Recall the definition of B(p , Ve):
r q(p) 
1= 138 ru(p , q) - cr]g(q ,p)dq}
Integrating by parts and substituting from (37) , 
J qb $ (39) B(p , Ve) = b(s) [u(q) - p]g(q)dq + �s{b(s) [u(qb) - p] - cr
q
a 
- b(•) I:� (q) G (q)dq}
q*(p, Ve)
where g(q) is the p. d. f of quality defined on [qa, qb]. When p* e (Pa•Pb) ,
it still holds that Ve = B(p*,Ve). Thus , using the definition of
q*(p ,Ve) and letting ue be the expected value of u(q) with respect
to g(q), 
(40) b(s)[u(q*(p*)) - p*]- cr = Ve = B(p* ,Ve) 
l- 13S 
13s 
= b(s) [uep] + 1_13s J qb{b (s) [ u(qb) - p*] - ci_ b (s) u' (q) G(q)dq}
q*(p*) 
1 L L J qb= b(s)ue - 1- 13 p*- l..;.13s cr + 1- 13 . {u(qb) - �' (q)G(q)dq}.
q*(p*) 
q*(p*) must satisfy (40) for any value p*. Therefore, define 
(41) e (z) s s{ (1 - 13 )u - u(z) + (1 - 13)c + 13 u(qb)e r 
Then 0(q*(p*)) 0 is equivalent to (40).
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Lemma 8: There exists a unique solution z* to 6(z) = 0. Furthermore, 
p* e (p , pb) implies z* > q , and for c small, q < z* < qb.a a r a 
�: Differentiating (41) with respect to z ,  
6 1 (z) = -u 1 (z)[l - 13SG(z)] � 
u'(z) > 0 for all z implies 0'(z) < 0 since G(z) is the c. d.f. 
of quality. Moreover , 
Clearly 0(q ) > 0. This combined with 6'(z) < 0 for all z > 0 anda 
lim 6(z) < 0 implies z* such that 0(z*) = 0 exists and is unique. 
z+oo 
z* < qb if and only if e(qb) < o. This is the case when c is small.r 
Lemma 8 establishes that q*(p*) is independent of p* - - at the margin, 
acceptable quality ls constant. Moreover , at the margin it always 
pays to allow for rejecting some quality levels. But the important 
result is that, other things constant, as s rises, q*(p*) falls. 
Let q*(p*; s) be the reservation quality associated with the reservation 
price when durability is s periods. 
(43) dql''(p; t) 
dp 
1 
u' (q>�(p;t)) 
Now, u"(q) < 0 implies u'[q*(p>�(s);s)] < u'[q>�(p*(s + l);s + l)] 
since q*(p*(s);s) > q*(p>�(s + l); s + l), Thus, 
.(44) 1 
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1 
u' [q*(p*(s) ;s)] 
dq*(p*(s);s) < dq*(p*(s + l);s + l) dp dp u' [q*(p*(s + 1) ;s + 1)] 
which implies u'[ql'<(p*(s);s)] > u'[q*(p*(s + l);s + l)], contradicting 
u"(q) < O. Therefore it must be that p*(s) > p*(s + l). 
Theorem 10 establishes that regardless of the size of cr and regardless
of whether Ve(s) rises or falls with an increase in s, the optimal
reservation price, p*(s), is decreasing in s, The reason for this 
is that as the durability of the good increases, opportunities to 
correct for poor quality observations are postponed into the future. 
Thus, the consumer needs to be more selective prior to evaluating 
the good -- he invests relatively more in search and p>�(s + 1) < p*(s) 
for all s > 1. 
The question of whether Ve(s) rises or falls or s increases
is more difficult to answer, If cr = 0 then Ve (s) > Ve (s + 1); as s
increases there are no benefits to offset the cost of postponing 
repurchase decisions. As cr rises, benefits began to weigh against
these costs as total repurchase costs fall when s increases. 
Conceivably, Ve(s) < Ve(s + l) for some cr'
A final question concerns the expected number of purchases 
before a satisfactory good is found. For a given s this is defined 
by the inverse of the probability that a satisfactory good is found 
on a given purchase, This value is 
(45) E(N;s) -1 -1 f p*(s) {F(p*(s)) f(p) [1- G(q*(p;s)) ]dp} , 
Pa 
As s increases there are two effects; p* falls but q*(p;s) may rise. 
or fall. This leaves �E(N;s)/�s ambiguous, The precise expression 
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is complicated, but it appears that the normal case is �E(N;s)/6s < O; 
as durability increases, the expected number of purchases prior to 
finding a satisfactory good falls. At the same time, p*(s) > p*(s + 1) 
implies the expected number of searches or inspections prior to 
making an initial purchase increases when s rises; there is a shift 
toward inspection ar·d away from evaluation when durability increases. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The key results of this paper are in sections 4 and 5. 
Section 5 analyzes the general model and bears out the contention 
in the introduction that Nelson's theory of search and experience 
is very restrictive. In particular, when goods are characterized 
by multiple characteristics and there is a natural ordering of 
observation of these characteristics (here enforced by assuming that 
quality cannot be observed prior to purchase), then there is no such 
thing as a search good; if it pays consumers to distinguish goods 
by price, then quality is never completely irrelevant. Similarly, 
price is never irrelevant unless all price and quality pairs are 
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acceptable. Suppose p* = pb. Then all prices are acceptable. But
unless q*(p) = q(p) for all p e [pa, pb]' then price still matters
in the sense that acceptable quality is sensitive to observed price. 
The only case in which acceptable quality is independent of the 
distribution of price is when cs = 0 and p* = Pa· In this case it
is true that only quality is relevant to the decision as to which 
goods are acceptable, but the driving force in that conclusion is 
perfect information with respect to price. 
Section 5 considers the important question of how the 
optimal policy responds to changes in the lifetime of goods. The 
main result there is that p* declines as s rises, regardless of the 
relationship of q>� (p; s) to q>'<(p; s + 1). The "normal" case, however, 
is that in which V (s) > V (s + l) and, as a consequence, q*(p;s) > q*(p;s + l).e e 
An increase in durability in this case causes a shift away from 
investment in evaluation and toward investment in inspection. 
Of course, this model suffers the same shortcoming of all 
one-sided search models, it doesn't explain what generates �(p,q). 
The existence theorem (given in the appendix) shows that an optimal 
policy exists regardless of the specific form of � (p, q),. While 
uniqueness of p* as well as some other properties of the optimal policy 
are sensitive to the form of �(p,q), most of the results of section 4 
are not affected. The same cannot be said for the results of 
section 5 (except perhaps in the case where 3B(p,Ve)/3p > 0 ; p* is
unique, and high prices are acceptable). 
As far as extensions of the present analysis are concerned, 
the natural directir.n is to allow for observing quality prior to 
f. · t T.n..i'le this assumption is not valid purchase at some inite cos • w11 
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for all dimensions of quality, there are certainly some trade-offs. 
As noted in the introduction, this is essentially the kind of problem 
analyzed by }!acQueen [1962]. The major difference is that MacQueen 
did not allow for the possibility of new search at the end of the 
good's lifetime if quality turns out to be unsatisfactory. That is, 
after observing price at cost cs the consumer could either (1) reject
the good; (2) buy the good without observing quality; or (3) pay CT
and observe quality prior to purchase. In the last case, if the 
observed quality is low the good is rejected. If it is high, the 
good is purchased and search terminates forever. In case (2), where 
the good is purchased without observing quality, there is no opportunity 
for new search when quality turns out to be poor. Allowing for this 
possibility is an interesting extension of the present analysis. 
However, if some qualitative features involve very high inspection 
costs (i. e. , if it is very �xpensive to observe these features prior 
to purchase) then the basic results of this paper will be preserved. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix gives the proof of theorem 1 on page 12. 
Theorem 1: Given (Al)+(A6), there exists a unique continuous, 
bounded solution to the functional equation (9). 
Proof: The proof of this theorem is a straightforward application 
of Denardo [1967]. Let h(•) be a continuous, bounded function on 
Consider the operator 
(Th) (x) -c + max { h ,B(x,h )}s e e 
where B(x,he) is defined in (7) and (8) and he is the expected value
of h(x) with respect to the marginal p.d.f. f(p). (Th) (x) is clearly 
bounded and continuous since U(p,q) is bounded and continuous. 
Therefore, if T is monotone and a contraction, then by Denardo 
[1967], there exists a unique h*(x) such that (Th*)(x) = h*(x) for 
i) T is monotone: Let h1(x) and h2(x) be continuous and bounded
1 2 on [pa,pb] such that h (x) � h (x) for all x E[pa,pb]. Then
1 2 i i he(x) � he(x) where he is the expected value of h (x) with respect
to f(p). 
(Th 1) (x) > 
1 2 Furthermore, B(x,h ) > B(x,h )e - e 
2 (Th ) (x) for all x E [pa,pb].
Then, 
ii) T is a contraction: Let p(h1; h2) = supjh1(x) - h2(x) J.
XE (pa,pb]
then showing T is a contraction reduces to showing that 
jh1 - h2j < p(h1,h2) and jB(x,h1) - B(x,h2)j < kP(h1,h2) for somee e - e e -
O <  k < 1 and any continuous, bounded functions on [pa,pb], h
1 and
2 I 1 2 h • Clearly f(p) non-degenerate implies he - hel �
1 2 p(h ,h ).
Now consider I B(x,h1) - B(x,h2)1. Integrating by parts· e e 
and defining � (wlp) = G(q(w,p)I p) where q(w,p) solves w = U(p,q), 
this reduces to 
where �(x) U(x,q(x)), Thus, 
I 1 . 2 B(x,h ) - B(x,h )e e 
But �(wix) < 1 over the above limits of integration. Thus, 
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1. 
FOOTNOTES 
These definitions of general and specific information 
obviously draw from Becker's [1975) work on human capital. 
The crucial feature of the analogy between training and 
information in that specific training involves an interaction 
between the worker and firm which is unique to each match-up; 
a worker cannot "buy" specific human capital short of actually 
taking a job in the firm associated with the training. On 
the other hand, general training, like general information, 
can be acquired without any special interaction with firms. 
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2. Prices and quality will be restricted to some compact subset
of R2. U(p,q) is defined over all positive values of P and q.
Thus it will be possible to talk of the stream of utility
obtained for any conceivable price/quality pair, even if the
3. 
pair will never be observed.
There are two elements of "search" in this model. Inspection 
consists of drawing observations from $(p,q) and observing p. 
Evaluation is the subsequent purchase of a good and the observation 
of q. Inspection is assumed to be a timeless activity, :he only 
cost is the direct sampling cost, cs. Evaluation is assumed
to take time. This stems from the necessary consumption of the 
4. 
5. 
good and induces two types of cost onto evaluation activity; 
the opportunity cost of consuming at a low quality level and 
the postponem�nt into the future of the possibility of 
rectifying the purchase of a poor quality good. Inspection 
is assumed to be a timeless activity in order to avoid 
confusing the latter effect. 
.It is implicit that price and quality combinations are such 
that it never pays to throw away a poor quality good and 
initiate new inspection prior to the end of the s-period 
lifetime of the good. Also, since inspection is timeless, 
it never pays to draw_ new samples from $(p,q) (in the event 
that (p ,q ) is a poor price/quality pair) until the end 0 0 
of s periods. 
These definitions take account of the fact that while 
U(p,q) is bounded on [pa,pb] x [qa,qb], ·it is well defined
for all p > 0, q > O. See footnote 2. 
6. Kohn and Shavell [1974) have included this case in their study
of the theory of search. But in their model, as in Nelson's,
there is no opportunity for the consumer to investigate only
some aspects of the good; either the cost of search is defined
to include the foregone opportunity cost of consuming at a low
quality level, or it is not -- there is no possibility for the
consumer to decide.
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